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CRACKS IN THE PROFESSION’S 
 MONOPOLY ARMOR 
Jack P. Sahl* 
INTRODUCTION  
The legal profession in the United States continues to enjoy its long-held 
monopoly in the nation’s legal services market.1  Historically, American 
courts are largely responsible for this monopoly and have relied on their 
“[a]ffirmative [i]nherent [p]ower . . . to regulate . . . every aspect of the 
practice of law.”2  For example, courts establish standards for admitting and 
 
*  Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Miller-Becker Center for Professional 
Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Art Garwin, Director of the American Bar Association Center for Professional 
Responsibility, Professors Stefan Padfield and Joann Sahl of the University of Akron School 
of Law, Frank E. Quirk, Director of the Miller-Becker Center, and Steve Crossland, Chair of 
the Washington State Bar Association’s Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT) Board, 
for their helpful comments.  I am especially indebted to Joseph Manno for his excellent 
research and assistance.  My thanks to Professor Bruce A. Green, Director of the Louis Stein 
Center for Law and Ethics, for inviting me to participate in this Colloquium, The Legal 
Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014). 
 1. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 824–27 (1986) (highlighting 
how the lawyer monopoly over much of the legal process today results from the combination 
of courts and lawyers controlling bar admission and state courts enforcing “common-law and 
statutory prohibitions against the unauthorized practice [of law]” (UPL), and noting that a 
“vigorous and expansive doctrine” of UPL did not occur in America until “sometime after 
the First World War”); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1981) (“[T]he profession has engaged in disturbingly little introspection 
concerning the proper scope of its monopoly.”). 
 2. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 24; see, e.g., NISHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Grp., 
LLC, 388 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Ark. 2012) (reversing a court ruling that a hearing’s arbitrator 
could decide who would represent the parties and holding that the state supreme court has 
“exclusive authority” to regulate the practice of law); id. at 451 (“[A] nonlawyer’s 
representation of a corporation in arbitration proceedings constitutes [UPL].”); Cleveland 
Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Davie, 977 N.E.2d 606, 616 (Ohio 2012) (holding that the state supreme 
court “has exclusive power to regulate, control, and define the practice of law in Ohio” and 
“if a statute or administrative rule purports to permit laypersons to practice law before a 
board or an administrative agency, this court retains the ultimate authority to determine what 
activities a layperson” may undertake before committing UPL); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013) (“The legal profession is largely self-governing. . . . 
[U]ltimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.”); WOLFRAM, 
supra note 1, at 79 (“The history of the regulation of the legal profession in the United States 
and England is primarily that of supervision by courts.”); cf. Brown v. Gerstein, 460 N.E.2d 
1043, 1052 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that the practice of law is a practice or trade and 
thus subject to consumer protection statutes); In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 777 (Tenn. 
1995) (deciding that the state legislature may authorize nonlawyer tax agents). 
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disciplining lawyers,3 and defining the unauthorized practice of law (UPL).  
This, in effect, excludes competition from nonlawyers4 and charges lawyers 
for court activities, including the operation of lawyer and judicial regulatory 
and disciplinary systems.5 
Courts often rely on bar associations for valuable input regarding these 
regulatory activities.6  Most notably, bar associations propose and assist 
courts in adopting ethics codes establishing behavioral norms for the 
 
 3. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 79 (noting that traditionally, “in many American 
jurisdictions, courts alone are authorized to discipline lawyers.  And normally that power is 
reserved to the state’s supreme court which typically delegates its exercise to a lawyer 
disciplinary agency” (citation omitted)); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 
para. 10. 
 4. UPL is broadly defined and construed in many states. See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. 
VII(2)(A) (providing that UPL is “[t]he rendering of [or holding out to the public that one 
could render] legal services for another by any person not admitted to practice in Ohio under 
Rule I of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar unless the person” 
qualifies for one of several exceptions, including being a licensed legal intern or a registered 
foreign legal consultant).  For examples of nonlawyer UPL, see Hansen v. Hansen, 7 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 688, 689 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a personal representative of a decedent’s 
estate who is not a licensed lawyer cannot appear “in propria persona” on behalf of the estate 
in matters outside the probate proceedings); Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, 689 
So. 2d 255, 259 (Fla. 1997) (finding UPL where salespersons and other employees 
“answered specific legal questions; determined the appropriateness of a living trust based on 
a customer’s particular needs and circumstances; [and] assembled, drafted and executed the 
documents”); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Joelson, 872 N.E.2d 1207, 1208 (Ohio 2007) (holding 
that a nonlawyer committed UPL when he prepared, signed, and filed documents in four 
lawsuits, including complaints, on behalf of Team Sports, Inc. because UPL is not limited to 
court appearances but includes “the preparation of papers . . . on another’s behalf” 
concerning a lawsuit (citing Cleveland Bar Ass’n. v. Misch, 695 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio 1998))).  
UPL also restricts the ability of lawyers to practice law in other states unless they become 
licensed to practice law.  Lawyers can apply to the court in a state that they are not admitted 
for pro hac vice status, permitting the lawyer to represent someone in particular litigation in 
that state court.  The lawyer must apply for a license in the foreign jurisdiction if the lawyer 
intends to practice in a foreign state court on more than an occasional basis.  ABA Model 
Rule 5.5, commonly referred to as the multijurisdictional practice (MJP) rule, permits 
lawyers to represent persons in a jurisdiction where they are not licensed if the representation 
is only on a temporary basis and does not involve the lawyer appearing before a tribunal. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5.  For a recent and excellent discussion about the 
many issues and problems concerning UPL statutes and enforcement, see Arthur F. 
Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 5.5—An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REV. 729 (2010); see also Rhode, supra 
note 1. 
 5. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
 6. See id. at 33–34 (observing that while appellate courts exercise power and initiative 
in regulating the legal profession, “courts serve as the largely passive sounding boards and 
official approvers or disapprovers of initiatives that are taken by lawyers operating through 
bar associations”); see also John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 
965 (2009) (“[S]tate supreme courts were . . . the prime regulators [and] typically acting in 
interplay with the bar.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1147 (2009). See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional 
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 707 (1977) (contending that lawyers drafted rules to 
promote their own interests in a self-regulatory context). 
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profession and standards and processes for lawyer admission and 
discipline.7 
But “the times they are a-changin’,” as Bob Dylan notes in the title of his 
song.8  Today, the law governing lawyers cannot be found in a single body 
of ethics rules, such as the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, produced internally by the “traditional duo of 
courts and bar associations.”9  Legislators, administrators, and federal 
judges are no longer willing to defer to state courts or bar associations.10  
As a result, the law governing lawyers is increasingly fragmented because 
authorities—many of them federal and external to the profession—now 
regulate lawyer behavior.11  This fragmentation has created a myriad of 
challenges and problems for regulators and the bar.  It has prompted one 
expert to comment:  “We are witnessing the decline of the ideal of 
professional self-regulation at the same time that the ideal has been almost 
entirely demolished in England.”12 
Although there are new regulators and related concerns, the “traditional 
duo of courts and bar associations” still plays a leading role in shaping the 
profession’s behavioral norms and preserving its monopoly over the 
delivery of legal services.13  This Article addresses two recent 
developments by the courts and bar associations that significantly affect—
or create cracks in—the profession’s monopoly on the delivery of legal 
services. 
Part I considers the Conference of Chief Justices’ (CCJ) recent adoption 
of Resolution 15, “Encouraging Adoption of Rules Regarding Admission of 
Attorneys Who Are Dependents of Service Members.”14  Resolution 15 
 
 7. See, e.g., Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, TENN. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.tba.org/info/tennessee-rules-of-professional-conduct (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) 
(tracing the development of the Tennessee rules). 
 8. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 
(Columbia Records 1964).  The scope and magnitude of change buffeting all aspects of the 
legal profession is dramatic. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Task Force Backs Changes in Legal 
Education System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2013, at A16 (reporting that the recent American 
Bar Association Task Force on the Future of Legal Education’s draft report calls for urgent 
and sweeping changes in legal education, and describing “the predicament of the many 
recent graduates who may never get the kind of jobs they anticipated” as “‘particularly 
compelling’”). 
 9. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 959. 
 10. Id. at 961. 
 11. Id. at 961–62.  For example, a host of federal agencies, like the SEC, have enacted 
rules governing the practice of law. Id. at 961 & n.6; see also Ted Schneyer, An 
Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 559 (2005); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 11 (2013) (“To the 
extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for 
government regulation is obviated.  Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s 
independence from government domination.”). 
 12. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 959, 961. 
 13. See id. at 961 (asserting that most new regulators tend to be federal). 
 14. Resolution 15:  Encouraging Adoption of Rules Regarding Admission of Attorneys 
Who Are Dependents of Service Members, CONF. CHIEF JUSTICES (July 25, 2012), 
http://msjdn.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/conference-of-chief-justices-resolution-15-
military-spouse-admission-final.pdf [hereinafter Resolution 15].  Resolution 15 uses the 
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urges state bar admission authorities to “develop[] and implement[] rules 
permitting admission without examination for attorneys who are 
dependents” of United States service members.15  Resolution 15 represents 
a significant doctrinal break with the longstanding tradition that lawyers 
must take an examination before being licensed to practice law in a 
jurisdiction unless their prior experience allows them to waive into that 
jurisdiction.  The CCJ’s new approach to regulating admission promotes 
competition from within the bar by facilitating the movement of lawyers 
from one geographic market to another. 
Part II of this Article discusses the Washington Supreme Court’s new 
Admission to Practice Rule (APR) 28, titled “Limited Practice Rule for 
Limited License Legal Technicians” (LLLT), and its impact on the 
profession’s legal services monopoly.16  The LLLT rule “allow[s] licensed 
legal technicians to help civil litigants navigate the court system.”17  
Washington’s LLLT rule promotes competition from professionals—
nonlawyer technicians—who are outside the bar. 
The Article concludes that both developments—Resolution 15 and 
Washington’s LLLT rule—promise to enhance competition for the delivery 
of legal services, but in different ways.  This Article contends that both 
Resolution 15 and Washington’s LLLT rule will indeed enhance consumer 
welfare. 
I.  RESOLUTION 15:  A DOCTRINAL BREAK FROM GEOGRAPHIC BARRIERS 
In recent years, there has been significant interest in, and support for, 
U.S. military personnel and their families from the public and the legal 
profession.18  For example, on January 24, 2011, President Barack Obama, 
 
phrase, “Dependents of Service Members,” which includes more than just military spouse 
attorneys. Id.  An earlier ABA Resolution 108, Admission by Endorsement, used the phrase 
“military spouse attorneys” when eliminating licensing barriers for military dependents who 
are lawyers. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 108 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_
delegates/resolutions/2012_hod_midyear_meeting_108.doc.  Most of the literature 
addressing the topic generally also uses the phrase “military spouse lawyers.”  This Article 
will use the latter term, in part because military spouse attorneys probably constitute the 
largest number of military dependents affected by the rule.  Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that Resolution 15’s use of “dependents” potentially includes nonspouse attorneys. See 
NAT’L MILITARY FAMILY ASS’N, FACT SHEET:  DEFINITION OF A DEPENDENT 1 (2005), 
available at http://support.militaryfamily.org/site/DocServer/Definiton_of_a_Dependent_11-
05.pdf?docID=3621 (defining the term military dependents). 
 15. Resolution 15, supra note 14. 
 16. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License 
Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf 
(adopting the new Admission to Practice Rule 28:  “Limited Practice Rule for Limited 
License Legal Technicians”). 
 17. Debra Cassens Weiss, In Washington State, ‘Legal Technicians’ Will Be Allowed To 
Help Civil Litigants, A.B.A. J. (June 19, 2012, 8:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/in_washington_state_legal_technicians_will_be_allowed_to_help_civil_litigan/. 
 18. See, e.g., Amber Nimocks, Admission Rules Relaxed for Military Spouse-Attorneys 
in North Carolina, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 9, 2013, at 9; Illinois Supreme Court Announces 
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First Lady Michelle Obama, and Dr. Jill Biden presented a document titled 
Strengthening Our Military Families:  Meeting America’s Commitment in 
response to a presidential study directive calling for a comprehensive 
federal approach by government agencies to improve support for military 
personnel and their families.19  The document outlined forty-seven 
initiatives by sixteen federal agencies to improve support for military 
families.  The First Lady and Dr. Biden promised to pursue such 
improvement through their Joining Forces initiative dedicated to connecting 
military personnel and their spouses with the necessary resources to obtain 
jobs.20 
Many Americans have some sense of military families’ hardships and 
sacrifices in serving the nation, especially given recent U.S. involvement in 
several international conflicts.21  One of the many challenges confronting 
military families concerns military spouse lawyers.  Because of frequent 
relocations, they often encounter serious licensure hurdles in their efforts to 
pursue legal careers.22 
Military families are forced to move every two to three years in addition 
to temporary or extended unaccompanied deployments.23  The impact of 
 
New Measures To Improve Legal Services for the Disadvantaged, ILL. LAW. NOW (June 24, 
2013 10:28 AM), http://iln.isba.org/blog/2013/06/18/illinois-supreme-court-announces-new-
measures-improve-legal-services-disadvantaged; Your Turn, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, 
Mar. 2, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4214508.  Current publicity for helping military 
spouses includes support from Stephen Spielberg, Oprah Winfrey, and Tom Hanks. See 
What We’ve Been Doing, WHITE HOUSE JOINING FORCES, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
joiningforces/photo-video (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 19. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUPPORTING OUR MILITARY 
FAMILIES:  BEST PRACTICES FOR STREAMLINING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ACROSS STATE 
LINES 2 (2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/pdf/Occupational_Licensing_
and_Military_Spouses_Report_vFINAL.PDF; see MARY REDING & ERIN MASSON WIRTH, 
REPORT TO CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (n.d.) (on file with Fordham Law Review). 
 20. Support for Our Heroes, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
joiningforces (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (reporting that “Joining Forces is all about coming 
together to support our nation’s military families” and ensuring that “no veteran has to fight 
for a job at home after they fight for our nation overseas”). 
 21. One hardship for military families is the difficulty faced by spouses seeking 
employment.  This is a serious problem but is often overshadowed by other pressing 
problems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder or helping wounded veterans. 
Many occupations require a state license, often with state-specific conditions and 
processes, which can cause lengthy re-employment delays for military spouses 
moving between states.  Because of these delays and the expense involved in re-
licensure, many spouses decide not to practice in their professions.  This is a 
difficult financial and career choice issue for military members and their spouses, 
potentially impacting their desire to stay in the military:  more than two thirds of 
married service members report their spouse’s inability to maintain a career 
impacts their decision to remain in the military by a large or moderate extent. 
Issue 2, USA 4 MILITARY FAMILIES, http://www.usa4militaryfamilies.dod.mil/pls/psgprod/
f?p=USA4:ISSUE:0::::P2_ISSUE:2 (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 22. MARY B. CRANSTON, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, 
REPORT 3 (2012), available at http://lawyerist.com/lawyerist/wp-content/uploads/2012/
04/ABA+108+Fnl.pdf. 
 23. Id. at 6 n.21 (citing DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., MILITARY FAMILY LIFE PROJECT 
(2010), available at conferences.cna.org/pdfs/longitudinalstudy.pdf) (reporting that active 
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these frequent moves is reflected in national statistics that show:  
(1) military spouses are more likely to be unemployed than their civilian 
counterparts; (2) military wives suffer a higher rate of underemployment 
than civilian counterparts; and (3) employed military wives earn less than 
civilian wives.24  The Department of Defense Military Community and 
Family Office has addressed some of the licensing barriers that confront 
military spouses through state legislation.25  The practice of law, however, 
is not regulated by the legislature, and redress must be sought from the state 
courts.26 
The Military Spouse JD Network (MSJDN) reports that less than one-
third of its members are employed in full-time legal positions and that 
approximately half are underemployed in paralegal positions or part-time 
work.27  MSJDN members claim that state licensing barriers hinder their 
employment opportunities, because rules for admission by motion or 
through reciprocity are too limited.28  For example, military spouses have 
difficulty in meeting the “‘previous practice’ requirements when:  they are 
recently admitted; their military spouse has been assigned overseas; they 
have breaks in employment between duty stations; they have held non-
attorney or part-time positions; or have been unable to find legal work at a 
duty station.”29  The consequence of not satisfying state rules regarding 
admission by motion is significant:  the applicant will have to pass an 
arduous two-and-a-half- to three-and-a-half-day, written bar examination 
and undergo a thorough character and fitness investigation. 
One report argues that these barriers create a significant cost for the 
public and the military families who are deprived of a spouse’s income.30  
The resulting economic and related stress from this loss of spousal income 
exacts a significant psychological toll on the spouse and family.31  The loss 
may also cause the nonlawyer spouse to leave the military.32  The report 
contends that these costs warrant different licensure treatment for military 
spouse lawyers.33 
The report further articulates several benefits to eliminating or 
minimizing licensure barriers.  First, even after being transferred, military 
 
duty spouses thirty years old and younger move every thirty-three months on average 
because of change of duty station). 
 24. Id. at 5. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 8. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See ABA MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (2012) (requiring applicants to 
have practiced for three of the five years prior to applying for admission); AM. BAR ASS’N 
COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_
meeting_105d_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf (accompanying the model rule on 
practice pending admission). 
 31. See CRANSTON, supra note 22, at 7. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. See id. at 1. 
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spouse lawyers can continue to provide legal services to their clients.  From 
a client perspective, clients are able to retain counsel of choice, which 
promotes consumer preference.  “As technology improves, more clients and 
employers want to retain military spouse attorneys who are transferred.”34  
UPL rules in many states, however, prohibit military spouse attorneys from 
“maintain[ing] their employment and continuing to serve their clients when 
transferred to and residing in a new jurisdiction.”35 
Another benefit of eliminating licensure barriers for military spouse 
lawyers is that it furthers access to justice for military personnel and their 
families.  Military spouse attorneys have developed unique skills that 
benefit their clients and possess special insights concerning the 
“complexities of military life and are well suited to serve clients in the 
military, either through paid or volunteer work.”36  Many of these military-
related clients may lack adequate resources to obtain legal services.  A 2010 
military survey found that 27 percent of service members have more than 
$10,000 in debt compared to 16 percent of civilians, and that more than 
one-third of military families have trouble paying monthly bills.37  Lawyers 
who are military spouses are uniquely positioned to possess a special 
sensitivity for assisting military families and veterans because their families 
may be similarly situated financially and may understand military culture.  
For example, they may understand family problems resulting from frequent 
redeployments.  This similarity in family experiences creates a good 
opportunity for military spouse lawyers to provide a more holistic approach 
to delivering legal services that addresses all of the client’s needs.38 
Against this backdrop, the CCJ adopted Resolution 15.39  Not 
surprisingly, given the nation’s support for military personnel and their 
 
 34. Id. at 9. 
 35. Id. at 9 n.31 (citing State Bar of Ariz., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 
Advisory Op. 10-02 (2010), available at www.azbar.org/media/75280/upl10-02.pdf). 
 36. Id. at 9. 
 37. FINRA INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 13 
(2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/documents/
foundation/p122257.pdf; see also Donna Gordon Blankinship, Mil Fams Face Money 
Problems, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/spouse/military-life/military-resources/
mil-fams-often-face-financial-struggles.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (citing a 2010 
military survey reporting that the unemployment rate among military spouses is 26 percent, 
and noting that a staff sergeant’s annual salary is about $39,000, not much money to support 
a family, especially when one member is sent overseas for long periods). 
 38. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46 (2d ed. 2009). 
 39. Resolution 15 provides: 
  WHEREAS, the states’ highest courts regard an effective system of admission 
and regulation of the legal profession as an important responsibility for the 
protection of the public; and  
  WHEREAS, the Department of Defense has recognized that military spouses 
face unique licensing and employment challenges as they move frequently in 
support of the nation’s defense; and  
  WHEREAS, the American Bar Association adopted a policy in February 2012 
recognizing that these short-term, compulsory moves for attorneys married to 
military service members result in unique problems that should be addressed by 
amending traditional bar admission rules; and 
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families, the CCJ encountered little resistance in adopting Resolution 15 on 
July 25, 2012.40 
A.  Resolution 15—The Assault on Territorial Restraints 
Resolution 15’s first provision underscores the courts’ fundamental 
gatekeeper function concerning admission and regulation of the legal 
profession.  It provides that the “states’ highest courts regard an effective 
system of admission and regulation of the legal profession as an important 
responsibility for the protection of the public.”41  This opening proposition 
is not particularly noteworthy given state courts’ long tradition of regulating 
the profession to protect the public’s interest. 
What is noteworthy however, is Resolution 15’s last provision.  It breaks 
with the longstanding notion that lawyers generally have to take a 
burdensome written examination before being licensed to practice law in 
another state.  The CCJ in Resolution 15 now “urges the bar admission 
authorities in each state and territory to consider the development and 
implementation of rules permitting admission without examination for 
attorneys who are dependents of service members . . . and who have 
graduated from ABA accredited law schools and who are already admitted 
to practice in another state or territory.”42  Resolution 15’s four other 
 
  WHEREAS, state bar admission authorities and state supreme courts remain 
responsible for making admission decisions and enforcing their own rules for 
admission; and 
  WHEREAS, issues relating to knowledge of local law can be addressed through 
a mandatory educational component; 
  NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of Chief Justices 
urges the bar admission authorities in each state and territory to consider the 
development and implementation of rules permitting admission without 
examination for attorneys who are dependents of service members of the United 
States Uniformed Services and who have graduated from ABA accredited law 
schools and who are already admitted to practice in another state or territory. 
Resolution 15, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 40. See Telephone Interview with Robert N. Baldwin, Exec. Vice President & Gen. 
Counsel, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts  (Oct. 16, 2013) (stating that Resolution 15 was adopted 
without any reported opposition). The CCJ adopted Resolution 15 as proposed by the CCJ 
Professionalism and Competence of the Bar (PCB) Committee  at the 2012 Annual Meeting 
on July 25, 2012. Id.  The PCB Committee had access to a “Report to the Conference of 
Chief Justices” submitted by Mary Reding, President and Co-Founder of the Military Spouse 
JD Network, and the Honorable Erin Masson Wirth, Co-Founder of the Military Spouse JD 
Network. Id.  The CCJ discussed the special challenges facing military spouse lawyers and 
the need for a proposed resolution to eliminate licensing barriers. Id.  The PCB materials for 
the meeting included a draft rule. Id.  The lack of modification to the PCB Committee 
proposal may reflect broad support within the CCJ for Resolution 15. See, e.g., Brad Cooper, 
Military Spouse Attorneys Answer the Joining Forces Challenge, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 
14, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/14/military-spouse-attorneys-
answer-joining-forces-challenge (reporting that ABA Resolution 108, a rough counterpart to 
CCJ Resolution 15, was passed by the “500+ members of the ABA House of Delegates . . . 
without any opposition”). 
 41. Resolution 15, supra note 14. 
 42. Id. (emphasis added).  The ABA recently adopted a Model Rule on Practice Pending 
Admission Application (MRPPA) aimed at lessening the disruption to a lawyer’s career and 
life by permitting a lawyer to practice for up to a year upon applying for application to the 
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provisions support one of these two principles—the authority of state courts 
to regulate the bar, including admission,43 or the case for admission without 
examination.44 
Admission without examination for lawyers is not a new concept.45  The 
organized bar and state courts have long recognized the highly mobile 
nature of the bar and the concern that an examination complicates, if not 
deters, lawyer mobility.46  Most states have addressed this concern and the 
corresponding need to protect the public from unqualified lawyers by 
adopting admission-by-motion rules.47 
The ABA’s Model Rule on Admission by Motion is the prototype for 
state rules.48  It requires, in part, an applicant to be “primarily engaged in 
the active practice of law . . . for three of the five years immediately 
 
bar and notifying the state’s regulatory authority. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, 
supra note 30.  Washington, D.C., instituted a policy of admission pending application prior 
to the ABA Rule. Id. 
 43. See Resolution 15, supra note 14 (“[S]tate supreme courts remain responsible for 
making admission decisions . . . .”). 
 44. See id. (“[R]ecogniz[ing] that military spouses face unique licensing and 
employment challenges as they move frequently in support of the nation’s defense . . . .”); 
see also REDING & WIRTH, supra note 19 (providing the CCJ with important information 
about why lawyer-spouses of military personnel should be admitted on motion). 
 45. Wisconsin provides perhaps the most unique and longest exception to the general 
rule of lawyers having to pass an examination for bar admission.  Graduates of Wisconsin 
law schools are admitted automatically to practice law without examination. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
40.03.  Wisconsin’s admission without examination policy has not jeopardized the public’s 
interest in competent and ethical legal services. See, e.g., Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin 
Diploma Privilege:  Try It, You’ll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 645; see also Wiesmueller v. 
Kosobucki, No. 07-CV-211-BBC, 2009 WL 4722197 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 2009) (dismissing 
a recent court challenge to that rule). 
 46. The ABA’s new MRPPA reflects the organized bar’s appreciation for the increased 
mobility and accompanying licensure challenges of its members. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N 
ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 30.  The MRPPA allows a lawyer who holds a license to 
practice law in another U.S. jurisdiction and who has engaged in active practice for three of 
the last five years, to provide legal services in a new jurisdiction without a license for no 
more than 365 days.  The lawyer must meet other criteria too, including notifying the 
Disciplinary Counsel and the Admissions Authority in writing prior to initiating practice and 
not being the subject of a disciplinary matter. 
 47. Thirty-nine states permit admission without examination if the lawyer satisfies a 
number of conditions.  Many of these states add a reciprocity condition, namely that the state 
the lawyer is departing from must accord admission without examination to members of the 
lawyer’s new state. See AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., ADMISSION BY MOTION RULES (2014), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/adm
ission_motion_rules.authcheckdam.pdf; see, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 34 (providing for 
admission by motion if certain conditions are met, including reciprocal admission rules for 
Arizona lawyers in the state that the lawyer is departing); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of 
Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch, No. CV-12-1724-PHX-BSB, 2013 WL 5297140 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 19, 2013) (challenging the rule); see also Joan C. Rogers, Limiting Admission on 
Motion to Lawyers from States with Reciprocity Is Not Illegal, 29 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 
(ABA/BNA) 610 (Sept. 23, 2013) (reporting that Arizona’s reciprocity requirement in its 
admission by motion rule is constitutional and effectuates “the state’s legitimate interest in 
regulating the practice of law for public protection purposes” and “encourage[s] other states 
to admit Arizona attorneys on similar terms” (citing Berch, 2013 WL 5297140)). 
 48. MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (as amended Aug. 6, 2012). 
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preceding” the date of application, to be in good standing in all jurisdictions 
where the lawyer is currently licensed and not currently subject to lawyer 
discipline or the subject of a pending discipline matter, and to demonstrate 
the requisite fitness and good character to practice law.49  These 
requirements advance the ABA’s goal of protecting the public from 
unqualified lawyers while facilitating lawyer mobility.  Essentially the 
courts, bar, and the public have a three-year track record of legal work to 
assess the lawyer’s competency, ethics, and professionalism.50  In addition, 
the admission-without-examination rule assumes that the newly admitted 
lawyer will not harm clients or the courts by failing to learn local law and 
practice—a frequently cited justification for requiring an examination 
before bar admission.51 
Not all lawyers can meet state requirements for admission by motion.  
For example, many lawyers, including military spouses, have difficulty in 
meeting the “previous practice” requirements.52 
The CCJ followed the customary track of considering bar input before 
adopting Resolution 15 and its policy changes regarding bar admission and 
discipline.53  This is poignantly illustrated by the CCJ’s explicit reference to 
the ABA House of Delegates’ recent adoption of ABA Resolution 108, or 
the Admission by Endorsement (ABE) Resolution.54  Although the CCJ did 
not adopt all of the ABE recommendations in Resolution 15, the similarity 
in language between ABE and Resolution 15 further evidences the bar’s 
influence on the CCJ’s adoption of Resolution 15.55  A review of the ABE 
Resolution is helpful to better understand the CCJ’s Resolution 15. 
The ABE Resolution most notably “urges state and territorial bar 
admission authorities to adopt rules . . . and procedures,” including 
admission by endorsement to “accommodate the unique needs of military 
spouse attorneys.”56  The ABE’s “admission by endorsement” phrase 
means the same thing as Resolution 15’s phrase, “admission without 
examination.” 
The ABE Resolution requires attorney-spouses to satisfy several other 
criteria before gaining bar admission.  The additional criteria include a 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Another condition for admission by motion in many states is reciprocity—that two 
states accord each other’s bar members similar admission by motion benefits.  The ABA 
discourages reciprocity as a requirement for admission by motion. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N 
ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 30 (accompanying the model rule for admission by motion). 
 51. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. CT. APP. R. 520.10 (requiring an attorney to obtain a certificate of 
legal education from the New York State Board of Law Examiners as part of admission by 
motion). 
 52. CRANSTON, supra note 22, at 8. 
 53. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 965. 
 54. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14. 
 55. ABE recommendations not in Resolution 15 include:  reviewing current bar 
application and admission procedures to minimize any burdens on military spouses and to 
promptly handle their applications; encouraging mentoring programs to better integrate 
military spouse attorneys with the bar; and offering reduced bar application and admission 
fees in the lawyer’s new and old jurisdictions. Id. 
 56. Id. 
2014] CRACKS IN THE PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY ARMOR 2645 
requirement that the attorney-spouse demonstrate a presence in the 
jurisdiction because of his or her military spouse’s service.57  The attorney-
spouse must also establish that the attorney is not currently subject to 
lawyer discipline or the subject of a pending disciplinary matter, pay client 
protection fund assessments, and comply “with all other ethical, legal and 
continuing legal education obligations.”58  The ABE Resolution further 
recommends that state admission authorities review bar application 
standards and procedures in the hope of facilitating the licensure of military 
spouse attorneys.59 
The additional ABE criteria, such as the applicant showing that he or she 
is not currently subject to lawyer discipline, seem reasonable in light of the 
profession’s substantial, if not overriding, interest in protecting the public 
from problem lawyers.  Interestingly, Resolution 15 does not expressly 
incorporate these additional criteria. 
One possible explanation for the absence of the additional ABE criteria is 
that the CCJ thought it a better strategy to let the states choose which, if 
any, additional criteria are appropriate to protect the public’s interest given 
the CCJ’s landmark recommendation eliminating examinations for 
admission for military spouses.  This approach allows state courts to tinker 
with the details of Resolution 15’s major doctrinal change, making 
Resolution 15 politically more palatable to the states, in part, by appearing 
less intrusive in state court regulation.  Two broad provisions in Resolution 
15 support this explanation and permit states to incorporate additional ABE 
criteria.  The first one underscores that it is the responsibility of the states’ 
highest courts to establish a system of admission and regulation for 
protecting the public.60  The second provision notes that this responsibility 
belongs solely to the states’ highest courts.61  Whatever the reasons for not 
including the additional criteria, states are well advised to adopt some or all 
of the ABE criteria as additional safeguards for protecting the public from 
problem lawyers. 
The ABA considered a variety of information in adopting the ABE 
Resolution.  One key source was the twelve-page report submitted by Mary 
Cranston, the chair of the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession.62  
The Cranston report incorporates other important sources of information, 
for example, Department of Defense (DOD) studies and reports.63  Some of 
the information in the Cranston report was reflected in a different report 
submitted to the CCJ for its consideration in adopting Resolution 15.64 
 
 57. Id. at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Resolution 15, supra note 14. 
 61. Id. 
 62. CRANSTON, supra note 22. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See supra note 40 (discussing the report before the PCB Committee when it was 
considering possible action concerning military dependents who are lawyers). 
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There was ample support for the CCJ’s conclusion that military spouse 
lawyers face unique licensing problems because of “short-term, compulsory 
moves” and that “issues relating to knowledge of local law can be addressed 
through a mandatory educational component.”65  Stated differently, the CCJ 
decided that the traditional justification for requiring a written examination 
for lawyers, specifically to protect the public from unqualified lawyers—in 
effect, creating a territorial barrier to entry—was unnecessary for military 
spouse lawyers.  A number of states have adopted Resolution 15’s 
recommendations and admit military spouse lawyers on motion where 
examination is generally required for other lawyers.66 
Resolution 15 promotes client and public welfare in several ways.  First, 
Resolution 15 increases the supply of lawyers available to provide legal 
services.  This increase in lawyer supply, albeit in small number, 
nevertheless is a plus for consumer choice and competition in any given 
market. 
Military spouse lawyers also offer a special type of legal service because 
of their unique experiences and insights about military life.67  This special 
quality may be attractive to military personnel, their families, and veterans.  
A significant percentage of these clients may be from low- or middle-
income brackets and unable to obtain legal services.  Thus, military spouse 
lawyers may promote access to justice for these economically challenged 
clients. 
Resolution 15 also promotes the public’s interest by protecting the public 
from unqualified lawyers by requiring those who waive in to attend a 
mandatory educational program that can address any deficiency in 
knowledge of local law.68 
Resolution 15 also makes it easier for individual military spouse lawyers 
to realize a return on their significant investment of time and money in 
obtaining a law degree.  In general, Resolution 15’s benefits are important 
to consumers, the profession, and the courts. 
B.  Extending Resolution 15’s Reach 
Resolution 15’s doctrinal change to eliminate admission by examination 
for military spouse lawyers is expressly tied to the “unique licensing . . . 
challenges” resulting from compulsory and frequent moves “in support of 
the nation’s defense.”69  More important, the doctrinal change is premised 
 
 65. Resolution 15, supra note 14; see also supra note 40. 
 66. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 38(i); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 229; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 719; 
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW N.C. R. 0503; S.D. SUP. CT. R. 13-10; TEX. 
OCC. CODE ANN. § 55.004 (West 2012). 
 67. CRANSTON, supra note 22, at 9. 
 68. Resolution 15, supra note 14. 
 69. Id.  The ABE Resolution language is similar:  “[To] accommodate the unique needs 
of military spouse attorneys who move frequently in support of the nation’s defense . . . .” 
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14, at 1.  State courts will occasionally exempt a certain class of 
lawyers from general bar requirements, for example, permitting unlicensed lawyers to 
practice law if it is on a pro bono and temporary basis. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 14 (2013); infra note 121 (discussing this trend). 
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on the belief that eliminating the examination requirement will not increase 
the risk of harm to the public from incompetent or unethical lawyers.70 
Resolution 15’s mandate should be extended to all lawyers to eliminate 
the need for a written examination for lawyers who cannot meet the 
“practice requirements” for admission by motion.  This is especially true in 
an era of increased lawyer mobility and new technologies that make it 
possible for lawyers to relocate across state borders and still serve clients. 
There are many lawyers, besides military spouse lawyers, who cannot 
meet the practice requirements for admission by motion.  These lawyers are 
faced with the daunting prospect of taking an onerous written examination 
to relocate and hopefully to pursue their profession.  A total of 90,973 
lawyers graduated from ABA-accredited law schools over a two-year 
period from 2011 to 2013.71  None of these graduates would meet the three-
year practice requirement for admission by motion. 
Like military spouse lawyers, some of these lawyers may feel compelled 
to move at the behest of their employer or to follow a spouse who moved at 
the request of an employer.  More important, whether the lawyer is seeking 
to move to another state voluntarily or not should not be the deciding factor 
and overshadow the fact that the lawyer is still facing the same barriers and 
related costs to relocation as military spouses, principally, taking a bar 
examination. 
The benefits of eliminating examinations for military spouse lawyers 
who move to another state also apply to nonmilitary spouse lawyers who 
move.  Nonmilitary-related lawyers who move offer the prospect of 
increased competition in another state market, which theoretically should 
drive down the cost of legal services.  Also, the lawyer who moves to 
another state increases consumer choice for legal services.  This is 
especially true for lawyers who relocate because of their client-employer’s 
request.  The employer is able to retain its counsel of choice and still realize 
 
 70. The CCJ never expressly said military lawyer spouses deserve special treatment and 
were entitled to admission by motion even if it meant placing the public at increased risk of 
harm. 
 71. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED 1963–2012 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admission
s_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf.  For illustration 
purposes only, assume that for this two-year period, 70 percent of 90,973 or 63,681 
graduates passed the bar exam and found full-time legal employment.  The 63,681 lawyers 
would automatically fall short of the three-year practice requirement under the ABA model 
rule and many state rules for admission by motion.  If 10 percent of these 63,681 lawyers—
or 6,368—sought to move to another state, they would be facing the cost and time of taking 
and hopefully passing another two- to three-day examination.  Of course, the illustration’s 
numbers could be higher if you consider that many lawyers may not be able to find full-time 
employment, especially with today’s difficult job market for law graduates.  The 
illustration’s numbers do not include additional lawyers who have practiced for more than 
three years but were then subsequently laid off from work and found only part-time legal 
work.  Some of these lawyers may wish to move to a new state and resume full-time legal 
employment.  They might have difficulty meeting the three years in practice requirement for 
admission by motion that would further add to the number of lawyers harmed by the 
examination requirement barrier. 
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the advantages of having him or her relocate.  Some of these lawyers may 
possess experience and expertise—for example, an immigration lawyer who 
speaks Spanish—that may fill a consumer need for such services.  Finally, 
like military spouse lawyers, nonmilitary spouse lawyers are able to realize 
a return on their investment in their legal education and contribute to 
society’s well-being. 
Resolution 15 may affect only a very small fraction of the total number 
of lawyers in the United States.72  The significance of Resolution 15 lies not 
in the number of lawyers it affects but rather in its recognition that 
mandatory educational courses about local law sufficiently protect the 
public’s interest against incompetent lawyers.  It is a de facto recognition 
that written examinations that serve as territorial barriers to entry in the 
legal services market are unnecessary to protect the public’s interest from 
unqualified or unethical lawyers.  Resolution 15 expressly acknowledges 
that any perceived knowledge deficiency regarding local law and procedure 
can be remedied by a less restrictive alternative of requiring a mandatory 
education course. 
States should follow Resolution 15’s lead and open up the licensure 
process to admission by motion for all lawyers, assuming they meet other 
additional criteria like some of those identified in ABE—for example, not 
being the subject of a pending disciplinary matter.  Opening the state 
markets to increased lawyer competition by admission by motion provides 
significant benefits to consumers and to the individual lawyers with little, if 
any, downside.  Time will tell whether the CCJ’s break with the 
examination tradition will lead to extending the same benefits to 
nonmilitary related lawyers but, at the end of the day, territorially based 
barriers are unnecessary. 
II.  SHEDDING THE “BARBARIANS AT THE GATE” SYNDROME:   
ALLOWING NONLAWYERS INTO THE CLUB 
Even stronger than the territorial barriers that the legal profession has 
maintained are the monopolistic barriers it has constructed to defend itself 
against incursion by nonlawyers into the delivery of legal services.  Now, 
however, a growing recognition of the lack of access to justice has led some 
in the profession to conceptualize and to implement plans to address the 
problem not just by permitting—but also by inviting—nonlawyers to the 
table. 
 
 72. Less than 1 percent of Americans serve in uniform. WHITE HOUSE, STRENGTHENING 
OUR MILITARY FAMILIES:  MEETING AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_initiative/strengthening_our_military_jan
uary_2011.pdf.  It is estimated that 10 percent of civilian military spouses have advanced 
degrees, of which a law degree is one of many. Id. at 16. 
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A.  The Great Need:  Access to Justice 
Some observers believe that the U.S. legal system is one of the best in the 
world.73  Many Americans do not share that belief.  They are financially 
locked out of the legal system—too poor to afford legal assistance for 
navigating the system.  This lockout, often referred to as the nation’s 
“access to justice crisis,”74 is a generally accepted proposition.  Many 
scholars and others have commented about the longstanding need to 
increase access to justice in the United States.75 
Statistics underscore the enormity and ever-increasing gap between the 
need for, and the availability of, legal services.76  More than 100 million 
people in the United States “are living with civil justice problems, many 
involving basic human needs” such as retaining housing, employment, and 
custody of children.77  Many of these persons never seek assistance for their 
 
 73. See TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE 
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 51 (2012), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS2012-APPENDICES.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO 
CHIEF JUDGE]. 
 74. The phrase “access to justice” may be defined in different ways. Brooks Holland, 
The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule:  A National First in 
Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75, 78 n.13 (2013).  This paper defines “access to 
justice” as “the ability of individuals, regardless of financial [circumstances], to access the 
resources necessary to participate meaningfully and equally in our system of civil justice.  In 
our legal system, these resources necessarily include some legal knowledge and training.” Id. 
 75. For a recent and helpful article discussing the nation’s access to justice crisis, see 
Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205 (2014).  
Cooper’s article highlights both the enormity and seriousness of the access to justice crisis 
quoting several sources. E.g., Alan W. Houseman, The Future of Civil Legal Aid:  Initial 
Thoughts, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 265, 265 (2010) (“[E]qual justice is not a reality for 
millions of Americans[,] . . . particularly . . . low-income Americans who do not have 
meaningful access to legal information, advice, assistance, or actual representation in 
court.”).  In Access to Justice Without Lawyers, Cooper examines three ways to increase 
access to justice, including the licensing of nonlawyers to provide legal services. See 
generally Cooper, supra.  This Article builds upon Access to Justice Without Lawyers and 
other works to argue that the Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision authorizing 
nonlawyers to deliver limited legal services represents a significant crack in the profession’s 
monopoly over the delivery of legal services. E.g., Holland, supra note 74; see DEBORAH L. 
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers As Citizens, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009).  Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of the New York Court 
of Appeals is a leading voice concerning access to justice who is not from the academy. See 
REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, at 51 (“[E]qual justice is fundamental to our society, 
and something . . . [that] differentiates our country from others . . . in the world[;] . . . access 
to justice is not a luxury in good times [but is] something that now more than ever, given 
what is going on in . . . our country is so necessary.”). 
 76. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of 
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 101–03 (reporting a recent “renaissance” of 
empirical and other “research investigating the delivery of legal services and public 
experience with civil justice,” including a 2012 commitment by the Legal Services 
Corporation to use “robust assessment tools,” as well as the American Bar Foundation’s 
establishment in 2010 of an Access to Justice research initiative, and a 2010 Access to 
Justice Initiative by the Department of Justice; providing an excellent research agenda that 
includes “how current definitions and understandings of access to justice may blind policy 
makers to more radical, but potentially more effective, solutions”). 
 77. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND. & UNIV. OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-
CHAMPAIGN, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING 1 (n.d.), available at 
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problems from a lawyer or a court; one recent study reports only “14% of 
civil justice problems were taken to a court or hearing body.”78  Although 
only a modest 14 percent seek court access for assistance with their civil 
justice problems, it still creates a significant burden for the courts and 
system.79  This is because an ever-increasing number of these cases that 
make it to court involve pro se litigants who present special challenges for 
lawyers and judges as they attempt to efficiently and justly resolve 
disputes.80 
The legal assistance system in the United States is diverse and 
fragmented, the product of outputs of many public-private partnerships, 
most of them small scale.81  States and communities differ in terms of 
resources available to fund legal services.82  They also differ in terms of 
offering different services to different populations.83  There is little 
coordination among the various service providers, making it difficult for the 
needy to contact the provider who can help.84  The diversity and 
fragmentation creates large inequalities between states, and within them, 
over what legal services are available to which populations.85  This further 
 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_-_civil_legal_
needs_and_public_legal_understanding_handout.pdf; see also REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & 
AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA, at v (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access_across_
america_first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf (providing the 
first state-by-state portrait of available services to assist citizens to access civil justice). 
 78. SANDEFUR, supra note 77, at 1–2 (noting that most Americans do not consider taking 
their problems to lawyers or the courts as the most common reason for not seeking 
assistance, and that a study found that in Great Britain a significant percentage of persons 
sought legal assistance when they perceived their problem as legal, and not a social, moral, 
or private matter). 
 79. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice:  
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 42 (2002); 
Vincent Morris, Navigating Justice:  Self-Help Resources, Access to Justice, and Whose Job 
Is It Anyway?, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 161, 165 (2013) (“The increasing number of unprepared 
self-represented litigants is causing a strain on court resources, resulting in congestion and 
delays within the court system.”). 
 80. See Paula J. Frederick, Learning To Live with Pro Se Opponents, GPSOLO, Oct.–
Nov. 2005, at 48, 50 (reporting that lawyers often complain about the “headaches” of dealing 
with pro se litigants); see also Morris, supra note 79.  For example, pro se litigants, 
sometimes referred to as unrepresented litigants, are generally unfamiliar with the law and 
court rules.  This may delay or prevent dispute resolution. See Benita Pearson, Judge, U.S. 
Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ohio, Panel Remarks at University of Akron School of Law 
Symposium:  Navigating the Practice of Law in the Wake of Ethics 20/20:  Globalization, 
New Technologies, and What It Means to be a Lawyer in These Uncertain Times (Apr. 5, 
2013) (transcript on file with the author) (reporting a noticeable increase in the number of 
pro se cases and that this development presents challenges for the judge). 
 81. SANDEFUR, supra note 77, at 2; SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 9. 
 82. SANDEFUR, supra note 77, at 2; SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that 
the most recent survey, now twenty years old, “of low- and middle-income households in the 
U.S. found that about half of the households were experiencing at least one problem that had 
civil legal aspects . . . and [that] was potentially actionable under civil law”). 
 83. SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 12. 
 84. Id. at 21. 
 85. Id. at 9. 
2014] CRACKS IN THE PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY ARMOR 2651 
complicates access to justice for many and places a premium on the location 
rather than the nature of the request for legal services.86 
More than 80 percent of the legal needs of the poor87 and 67 percent of 
the legal needs of middle-income Americans go unmet.88  Traditional 
methods of providing access to justice for these people are inadequate given 
the magnitude of the need.89  The vast need dwarfs the positive 
contributions of publicly funded legal aid and charitable-based 
organizations, pro bono efforts, and law school clinics—all of which are 
facing their own financial challenges in these difficult economic times.90  
New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman recently 
described the cuts to funding for civil legal services at the national level as 
“devastat[ing].”91  He further noted that support for legal services at the 
state level is also under stress.  Funds from New York’s Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program that helps finance some legal services for 
the poor plummeted from $36 million to $6 million.92  New York’s 
experience is not unique; many states are experiencing decreases in IOLTA 
funds.93 
 
 86. Id. (observing that “[i]n this context, geography is destiny:”  physical location and 
not the problems or services needed by the population determines the available legal 
assistance). 
 87. Cooper, supra note 75, at 205; see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE 
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:  THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 
14–15 (2005), available at http://www.mlac.org/pdf/Documenting-the-Justice-Gap.pdf; AM. 
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED 
SITUATIONS 77 (1995) (reporting that between 70 and 80 percent of the poor’s legal needs 
are unmet); Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 76, at 110 (“Studying access to justice by 
focusing only on the poor . . . limits our understanding of the relationship between legal 
services and inequality.  In the United States, access to justice is often treated as an aspect of 
anti-poverty policy, which belies the fact that we know surprisingly little about inequalities 
in access to civil justice.”). 
 88. RHODE, supra note 75, at 3; see Cooper, supra note 75, at 205–06; see also Alex J. 
Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2241 
(1999) (asserting that “many moderate-income households” are unable to access the justice 
system).  Although the poor may be the most significant group concerning the unmet need 
for legal services, other population groups are eligible for aid, including approximately 55 
million elderly, 2.5 million American Indians, over 22 million veterans, over 600,000 
homeless people, more than 36 million people with disabilities, and more than 1 million 
people with HIV/AIDS. SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 10. 
 89. Gillian K. Hadfield, Summary of Testimony Before the Task Force To Expand Access 
to Civil Legal Services in New York, RICHARD ZORZA’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG 1 (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/hadfield-testimony-october-2012-
final-2.pdf; see Cooper, supra note 75, at 205–09 (arguing that this scenario requires 
fundamental change in the way that the judiciary regulates the practice of law); see also 
Rhode, supra note 75, at 1330–31. 
 90. Hadfield, supra note 89; see Cooper, supra note 75, at 206. 
 91. REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, at 50; see also infra notes 94–98 and 
accompanying text (discussing national funding for civil legal services). 
 92. REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, at 50. 
 93. See, e.g., Cliff Collins, Leading the Way, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 2011, at 21, 22; 
Janet Eveleth, Interest Rate Drop Hurts IOLTA, MD. B. BULL. (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.msba.org/departments/commpubl/publications/bar_bult/2009/april/interestratedr
ops.asp; IOLTA Grant Information, IDAHO L. FOUND., http://www.isb.idaho.gov/ilf/iolta/
grants.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); see also Morris, supra note 79, at 165 (predicting an 
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There is little prospect of a massive injection of governmental money to 
fund legal services for the poor.94  The trend seems to be in the opposite 
direction.  Congressional funding for legal aid from the Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC) in fiscal year 2012 was reduced again from a total of 
$348 million to under $341 million.95 
Some argue that allocating additional money for legal services alone will 
not resolve the access to justice crisis.  For example, in 2012, Professor 
Gillian Hadfield testified before New York’s Task Force to Expand Access 
to Civil Legal Services in New York.96  She emphasized that the kind of 
legal services that ordinary New Yorkers need cannot be addressed by 
merely increasing the expenditure of public funds.97  She observed that the 
scale of the problem is too large—the legal services demand far outstrips 
both publicly funded and charitable supplies of lawyers’ services.98 
Instead, Hadfield argued that a fundamental restructuring of the delivery-
of-legal-services market is necessary to allow nonlawyers to deliver certain 
lower-cost legal services.99  Lawyers are too expensive for many low- and 
middle-income persons and the government cannot afford to subsidize 
enough lawyers to resolve the access to justice crisis.100 
Opening the legal services market to nonlawyers may seem like a radical 
proposal.  Hadfield points to nurse practitioners in the medical field as an 
example of how lower-cost service providers have helped narrow that 
industry’s demand-supply gap.101  Hadfield argues that the legal profession 
needs to find nonlawyers to deliver lower-cost legal services and notes that 
 
increase in unrepresented or pro se litigants because “federal funding . . . [IOLTA] grants, 
and state financial support continues to decrease for many free legal services and pro bono 
organizations”). 
 94. The enormity of the kind of injection needed is highlighted by the fact that almost 57 
million people were eligible for free legal services in 2009 according to a 2010 financial 
means test created by the federal Legal Services Corporation—the central funder of civil 
legal assistance in the United States. SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 10.  Under the 
2010 means test, a family of four making $27,641 or less would qualify for legal assistance. 
Id. 
 95. LSC Funding, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/lsc-funding (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014).  In 1974, Congress established the LSC to “fund . . . 134 independent 
nonprofit legal-aid programs in every state, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories.” 
Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp., Funding Cuts Expected To Result in Nearly 750 Fewer 
Staff Positions at LSC-funded Programs (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.lsc.gov/
media/press-releases/funding-cuts-expected-result-nearly-750-fewer-staff-positions-lsc-
funded (reporting that an LSC survey showed that “local legal aid programs expect to reduce 
staffing by nearly 750 employees in 2012, including 350 attorneys, because of funding cuts . 
. . represent[ing] a reduction of eight percent of full-time-equivalent (FTE) positions from 
the end of 2011”); see Morris, supra note 79, at 165 (citing the above LSC press release 
regarding staff reductions and contending that this “will likely continue [the] increase in the 
volume of self-represented litigation”). 
 96. Hadfield, supra note 89, at 1. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2–3. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 4. 
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Washington has already decided to do this and that other states are 
considering similar action.102 
The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education (Task Force) 
recently echoed the concerns of Hadfield and others that many low- and 
middle-income populations cannot afford to hire lawyers and embraced the 
idea of nonlawyers delivering legal services.  The Task Force noted that 
there are rarely alternatives to obtaining legal assistance other than from 
fully trained lawyers who have passed the bar.103  These populations will 
remain underserved because lawyers are unavailable to these clients unless 
the government or a private benefactor subsidizes their services—an 
unlikely prospect, especially in these difficult economic times.104 
The ABA Task Force reported that the high cost of lawyers’ services 
“has facilitated the use (or proposed use)” of nonlawyers “to deliver lower-
cost legal services,” including issuing limited licenses to deliver categories 
of legal services.105  Moreover, the ABA Task Force recommended to state 
regulators of law practice to authorize nonlawyers to provide limited legal 
services, either by licensing systems or other mechanisms ensuring proper 
education, training, and oversight.106  This recommendation reflects the 
new momentum for resolving the access to justice crisis by opening the 
legal services market to nonlawyers, especially in light of recent 
developments in Washington. 
B.  Washington’s Limited License Legal Technicians Rule—Enhancing 
Consumer Welfare? 
On June 15, 2012, a divided Washington Supreme Court issued a 
landmark order, the new APR 28.107  For the first time in the nation’s 
history, a state’s high court opened the market for the delivery of legal 
services to nonlawyers—a new professional class of legal service providers 
 
 102. Id. at 5–6. 
 103. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., DRAFT REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/task_force_on_legaleducation
_draft_report_september2013.authcheckdam.pdf.  The primary focus of the ABA Task 
Force’s draft report concerned the urgent problems confronting the U.S. legal education 
system and the diminished public confidence in the system. Id. 
 104. Id.; see REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, 56 (stating that “millions of New 
Yorkers today cannot meaningfully protect their rights because they can’t afford to hire an 
attorney” and acknowledging that “two point three million mostly low income New Yorkers 
are unrepresented in civil proceedings . . . every year” (emphasis added)). 
 105. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 103, at 12–
13.  The ABA Task Force acknowledged that the cost of a lawyer is unaffordable for many 
low- and some middle-income persons even though the supply of lawyers may exceed 
demand in some sectors of the economy. Id. 
 106. Id. at 30–31.  The Task Force also recommended that they commit to establishing 
uniform national standards for admission to practice as a lawyer. Id. at 30. 
 107. The vote was six to three. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule 
for Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005 (Wash. June 15, 2012), 
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-
1005.pdf. 
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titled limited license law technicians.108  LLLTs can open a professional 
practice giving some legal advice and assistance directly to clients without 
lawyer supervision—a radical paradigm shift because lawyer supervision is 
generally a prerequisite for nonlawyer legal services work.  This judicially 
authorized incursion into the profession’s monopoly over legal services, 
albeit in one state, is still very new and its impact is an open question.109  
APR 28, however, has attracted significant attention from other states110 
and scholars and it promises to be an important part of the ongoing dialogue 
addressing the access to justice problem.111 
The Washington Supreme Court highlighted the state’s “wide and ever-
growing gap in necessary legal . . . services for low and moderate income 
persons.”112  In issuing APR 28, the court also described Washington’s 
 
 108. Holland, supra note 74, at 91.  The court also established an LLLT board to oversee 
the implementation of the LLLT program. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(C); see also 
Kristen Kyle-Castelli, Foreword, Poverty Access to Justice Symposium, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA, 
at i, iii (2013) (describing APR 28 as “Washington’s pioneering [LLLT] rule”). See 
generally Amy Yarbrough, Limited-Practice License Idea Faces Challenging Path, CAL. 
B.J. (May 2013), http://www.calbarjournal.com/May2013/TopHeadlines/TH1.aspx.  In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, the California Bar studied the idea of licensing legal technicians 
as did the American Bar Association in the mid-nineties. Id.  The studies supported the idea 
but the licensure never occurred. Id. 
 109. See Yarbrough, supra note 108.  Robert Hawley, deputy executive director of the 
California Bar, stressed that for years in the legal services marketplace, “the supply of 
lawyers has risen, the demand for legal services has risen and the cost of legal services has 
risen.  ‘Under the economic laws of supply and demand, this is not possible . . . .  It can 
occur only in a monopoly and perhaps it is time for lawyers to give up their monopoly on the 
practice of law.’” Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. In January 2013, California’s State Bar Board of Trustees expressed an interest in a 
limited-practice law licensing program, with one trustee stating that many consumers cannot 
afford market rates for a lawyer’s service. Laura Ernde, State Bar To Look at Limited-
Practice Licensing Program, CAL. B.J. (Feb. 2013), http://www.calbarjournal.com/
February2013/TopHeadlines/TH1.aspx.  Assistant State Chief Trial Counsel Dane Dauphine 
reported that the state bar receives annually hundreds of complaints about the occurrence of 
UPL. Id.  State Bar Executive Director Hawley noted that what constitutes the practice of 
law involves some difficult line drawing but “interpreting legal authorities and customizing 
them to fit a consumer’s specific needs does invoke the practice of law, at least 
theoretically.” Id.  Another trustee urged his colleagues to examine Washington’s LLLT 
program because many persons in California are forced to turn to unregulated nonlawyers to 
address the public’s need for legal services. Id.; see Press Release, Laura Ernde, State Bar 
Group To Hold Public Meeting on Limited-Practice Licensing (Apr. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/News/Archives/2013NewsReleases/201306.aspx 
(reporting that the Limited License Working Group, involving a number of trustees and 
California Bar President Patrick M. Kelly, will review similar programs in Washington and 
Canada as a way to increase access to affordable legal services and protect the public).  At an 
April hearing of the California Bar’s Limited License Working Group, Washington State Bar 
Executive Director Littlewood described the state’s adoption of APR 28 as “a 10-year, pretty 
hard-fought battle” to permit nonlawyers to provide limited legal services to clients.  See 
Yarbrough, supra note 108.  Littlewood stated that “consumer protection is one of the 
‘highest ideals’ of her state’s program” and “cited figures indicating that eighty-five percent 
of indigent . . . families . . . are not being served anyway.” Id.  “The needs of the consuming 
public have never been ‘one size fits all’ . . . .  There is so much work to go around.  How 
can you take it away from people?’” Id.; see also Hadfield, supra note 89. 
 111. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 75; Holland, supra note 74. 
 112. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005 (stating that the 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study indicated 
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adversarial civil legal system as “complex [and] unaffordable,” placing 
many pro se litigants at a disadvantage and “forcing [them] to seek help 
from unregulated, untrained, and unsupervised ‘practitioners.’”113  The 
court and advocates of APR 28 hope that LLLTs will narrow the gap 
between the public’s ever-increasing need for legal assistance and available 
resources.114 
The Washington Supreme Court also noted a particular need for legal 
assistance in the family relations area in part because it is governed by a 
myriad of statutes.115  “[T]housands of unrepresented (pro se) individuals 
seek to resolve important” matters in court and are unable to obtain legal 
assistance “from an overtaxed, underfunded civil legal aid system.”116 
As a result, the court subsequently approved regulations that became 
effective September 3, 2013, authorizing domestic relations as the first 
practice area for LLLTs.117  The regulations permit LLLTs, without the 
 
that 85 percent of indigent families’ legal needs were not being served).  APR 28 was first 
submitted by the Washington Supreme Court’s Practice of Law Board in 2008 and revised in 
2012 after many comments. Id. at 1.  The majority of the Washington Supreme Court noted 
in its order that “the 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study documented moderate income people 
[too] (defined as families with incomes between 200% and 400% of the Federal Poverty 
Level).” See Telephone Interview with Steve Crossland, Chair of LLLT Board (Oct. 11, 
2013). 
 113. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005.  The Washington Supreme Court’s description of its civil 
legal system is likely applicable to other states. 
 114. The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education is one recent, albeit 
unexpected, advocate of the principle underlying Washington’s decision to license 
nonlawyers. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 
103, at 12–13 (reporting that “[t]he relatively high cost of the services of lawyers has 
facilitated the use (or proposed use) of persons who have not received a J.D. to deliver 
lower-cost legal services” and noting that changes are under way like in Washington with 
APR 28 to create “systems of limited licenses to deliver categories of legal service by 
persons who are not lawyers admitted to practice”). 
 115. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005. 
 116. Id.  The serious issues and enormous unmet need for legal assistance in the family 
relations field is a national problem.  For a recent discussion highlighting the inability of 
legal aid to handle the increasing number of requests for legal assistance concerning family 
law matters in Cleveland, see Kari White et al., Pro Se Divorce and Pro Se “Plus” Divorce 
Clinics—Helping Families Move On, CLEVELAND METRO. B.J., July/Aug. 2013, at 6, 38.  
“Legal aid is unable to help many of the individuals who need assistance with divorce and 
other family law matters.” Id. at 38.  As a result, many low-income individuals go without 
legal assistance with potentially profound consequences, including forcing some to “remain 
married to their spouse for many years, unable to navigate the maze of court pleadings and 
courtroom procedures.” Id.  For some individuals, this means 
they cannot adequately prepare for the future, because surviving spouses have 
certain rights that cannot be defeated by a will.  For others, it may mean that they 
are the presumptive parent of a child who is not their biological child—a legal 
presumption that carries with it a variety of additional obligations, including the 
obligation to support the minor child. 
Id.  The article emphasizes that “[t]he Domestic Relations Court urgently needs help in 
properly processing Pro Se divorce cases, which are on the upswing.” Id. at 39. 
 117. In commenting on the need for help in the domestic relations area in its APR 28 
order, the court further noted:  “Legal practice [in family relations] must conform to specific 
statewide and local procedures [and involve] standard forms developed at both the statewide 
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supervision of lawyers, to “advise and assist clients (1) to initiate and 
respond to actions and (2) regarding motions, discovery, trial preparation, 
temporary and final orders, and modifications of orders” in domestic 
relations.118 
The LLLT services permitted in the domestic relations area would 
generally constitute the practice of law in most states; this would be true for 
Washington too except for LLLT licensure.119  Nonlawyers who provide 
legal “advice and assistance” without the supervision of a lawyer would be 
subject to prosecution under state UPL statutes.120  UPL laws are designed 
to protect the public, the profession, and courts from incompetent or 
otherwise unscrupulous legal service providers.  UPL laws are also seen by 
some as a construct for limiting competition from nonlawyers and 
unlicensed lawyers delivering legal services.121 
Washington’s LLLT program promises more affordable legal services.  It 
also promises to protect consumers from harm.  The Washington Supreme 
Court made the public’s interest its lodestar in issuing APR 28.  “[T]he 
basis of any regulatory scheme including our exercise of the exclusive 
authority to determine who can practice law . . . , must start and end with 
the public interest . . . ensur[ing] that those who provide legal and law 
related service have the education, knowledge, skills and abilities to do 
so.”122  Washington State Bar Executive Director Paula Littlewood 
similarly emphasized that protecting the public is one of the bar’s “highest 
 
and local levels.” In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License 
Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005.  The Washington Supreme Court approved 
domestic relations as the first LLLT practice area in March 2013.  The LLLT board is 
currently receiving expressions of interest in the LLLT program since the domestic relations 
area rules became effective on September 3, 2013. See Interview with Steve Crossland, 
supra note 112. 
 118. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28 reg. app. 2:B2. 
 119. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Davie, 977 N.E.2d 606, 612 (Ohio 2012) 
(holding that a paralegal who helped prepare litigation forms for child custody performed the 
unauthorized practice of law). 
 120. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 79 B.R. 482, 485 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that a 
paralegal who gave advice to clients regarding bankruptcy matters engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law); People v. Milner, 35 P.3d 670, 686 (Colo. 2001) (holding that 
a paralegal who met with a client at an initial interview without an attorney’s oversight and 
advised the client to seek temporary custody of the client’s children and not to discuss the 
children’s welfare with social services engaged in unauthorized practice of law). 
 121. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:  AN ETHICAL STUDY 247–48 (1988) (arguing, 
in part, that the enforcement of UPL laws “prop[s] up legal fees” without promoting any 
other important public good).  The public protection rationale for UPL laws is questionable.  
For example, in Missouri, there is a special rule that allows unlicensed lawyers to practice if 
their work qualifies as pro bono.  If the UPL rationale is to protect the public from 
unqualified or at least locally unregulated lawyers, then why place pro bono clients—
perhaps some of society’s more vulnerable clients—in harm’s way?  One could argue that 
the Missouri UPL rule is really more about restricting competition from lawyers not licensed 
in Missouri for clients who can pay for legal services than protecting the public.  Missouri’s 
pro bono exception to its UPL rule places pro bono clients at risk of harm by permitting 
unlicensed Missouri lawyers to provide them with legal services. MO. SUP. CT. R. 8.105. 
 122. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005. 
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ideals” when discussing APR 28 before a California bar committee 
considering nonlawyer legal service providers.123 
Washington’s LLLT program appears to accomplish the state supreme 
court’s goal of protecting the public, in part, by requiring significant 
educational and experiential qualifications.  These requirements provide 
assurances to the judiciary and the public that LLLTs possess adequate 
educational and experiential skills for acting as fiduciaries and delivering 
legal services—essentially practicing law in a limited capacity.124 
LLLT applicants must have an associate of arts (AA) degree.125  They 
must also complete the LLLT core education requirement of forty-five 
credit hours in basic courses, such as contracts, civil procedure, and 
professional responsibility.126  The core education requirement also 
includes eight credit hours of legal research and writing—important skills 
courses.127  LLLT applicants can apply the forty-five credit hours of core 
LLLT courses towards earning their AA degree, generally a degree program 
that is two years or a total of sixty semester credit hours.128  “This will 
make the LLLT education even more affordable.”129 
 
 123. See Yarbrough, supra note 108.  Littlewood stated that “consumer protection is one 
of the ‘highest ideals’ of her state’s program” and “cited figures indicating that 85 percent of 
indigent . . . families . . . are not being served anyway.” Id. 
 124. Qualifications for taking the licensing application were amended on July 14, 2013.  
APR 28 requires applicants to be eighteen years old and to demonstrate good character and 
fitness to practice as an LLLT.  One also needs the following:  “an associate level 
degree . . . ;” forty-five credits of core education requirements in legal studies at an ABA-
approved law school or ABA-approved paralegal program; practice area courses in each 
practice area the applicant wishes to be licensed; and “3,000 hours of substantive law-related 
work experience.” WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28. 
 125. Id. 
 126. The Washington curriculum regulations read as follows: 
A. Core Curriculum.  An applicant for licensure shall have earned the following 
course credits at an ABA approved law school or ABA approved paralegal 
program: 
1.  Civil Procedure, minimum 8 credits; 
2.  Contracts, minimum 3 credits; 
3.  Interviewing and Investigation Techniques, minimum 3 credits; 
4.  Introduction to Law and Legal Process, minimum 3 credits; 
5.  Law Office Procedures and Technology, minimum 3 credits; 
6.  Legal Research, Writing and Analysis, minimum 8 credits; and 
7.  Professional Responsibility, minimum 3 credits. 
The core curriculum courses in which credit is earned shall satisfy the curricular 
requirements approved by the Board and published by the WSBA.  If the 
required core curriculum courses completed by the applicant do not total 45 
credits as required by APR 28D(3)(b), then the applicant may earn the 
remaining credits by taking legal or paralegal elective courses at an ABA 
approved law school or ABA approved paralegal program. 
Id. R. 28 app. reg. 3(A). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3333-1-04(C)(6) (2010) (listing the standards for 
approval of associate degree programs and requiring a minimum of sixty semester credits).  
An LLLT applicant is not required to earn an AA degree before enrolling in LLLT courses; 
both can be accomplished simultaneously.  For example, an applicant “may obtain an AA 
degree in paralegal studies which includes completion of the 45 [core] credits.” See E-mail 
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In addition to satisfactory completion of the core, the LLLT applicant 
must complete the “practice area curriculum requirements.”130  In the 
domestic relations practice area, an applicant must take a total of fifteen 
credit hours of domestic relations, with five of those credits in basic 
domestic relations subjects and another “ten credit hours in advanced and 
Washington specific domestic relations subjects.”131  This intensive 
concentration in family law strongly suggests LLLT graduates are more 
knowledgeable about domestic relations than their law school counterparts, 
who may take one general family law course.  In the law school curriculum, 
family law is typically a three–credit hour elective course.132 
The LLLT board and Washington’s three law schools are collaborating to 
provide the family law courses.133  The family law courses will be offered 
by a law school faculty member and probably at a law school.134  The 
courses will be available online at state community colleges and accessible 
from home.135  The easy access for the courses is in line with what one 
LLLT board member described as a three-prong approach, or the “Three 
As”:  affordability, accessibility, and academic rigor.136 
There should be a ready supply of recent community and baccalaureate 
college graduates who may find the LLLT career attractive, especially in 
these difficult economic times.137  LLLTs acquire professional status and 
 
from Thea Jennings, Ltd. License Legal Technician Program Lead, Regulatory Servs. Dep’t, 
Wash. State Bar Ass’n, to author (Dec. 3, 2013, 14:40 EST) (on file with author). 
 129. See E-mail from Thea Jennings, supra note 128. 
 130. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28 app. reg. 3(B). 
 131. The Washington regulations state: 
B. Practice Area Curriculum.  An applicant for licensure in a defined practice area 
shall have completed the prescribed curriculum and earned course credits for that 
defined practice area, as set forth below and in APR 28D(3)(c).  Each practice area 
curriculum course shall satisfy the curricular requirements approved by the Board 
and published by the WSBA. 
1.  Domestic Relations. 
a.  Prerequisites:  Prior to enrolling in the domestic relations practice 
area courses, applicants shall complete the following core courses:  
Civil Procedure; Interviewing and Investigation Techniques; 
Introduction to Law and Legal Process; Legal Research, Writing, 
and Analysis; and Professional Responsibility. 
b.  Credit Requirements:  Applicants shall complete five credit hours 
in basic domestic relations subjects and ten credit hours in 
advanced and Washington specific domestic relations subjects. 
Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Family Law:  Course Description, NYU L., http://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/
description.cfm?id=11325 (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 133. See Interview with Steve Crossland, supra note 112. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. The U.S. Department of Education reported that in 2010, 41.6 percent or 379,425 of 
the twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds in Washington held some kind of postsecondary 
degree (e.g., AA).  It estimates that percentage will increase to 60 to 62 percent or between 
655,000 and 676,000 by 2020. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New State-by-State 
College Attainment Numbers Show Progress Toward 2020 Goal (July 12, 2012), available 
at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-state-state-college-attainment-numbers-show-
progress-toward-2020-goal; cf. Donna Gordon Blankinship, Number of College Grads Drops 
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the ability to earn a living, either independently, or as an employee of a 
private or governmental entity.  For example, LLLTs might work for a 
social services agency or a law firm.  Law firms may find LLLTs attractive 
hires because, unlike paralegals and legal assistants, LLLTs will be able to 
assume more complete and direct responsibility for certain aspects of client 
matters—for example, advising clients on the selection of forms and how to 
respond to interrogatories.  This should free lawyers to focus on other 
important aspects of practicing law, such as directly negotiating contracts or 
settling claims with opposing parties and participating in hearings and 
trials.138  One expert on Washington’s LLLT rule noted that “[n]ot 
surprisingly, we have found that some forward-looking lawyers are 
considering how employing or working with LLLTs may fit into their 
business model.”139 
C.  LLLTs:  Some Concerns 
Some critics of LLLTs fear that they may be more likely to harm the 
public by committing fraud or engaging in unethical conduct.140  Like 
lawyers, there is no guarantee that LLLTs will avoid such offenses.  
However, LLLTs will be subject to an ethics code and a disciplinary regime 
that is modeled after the state’s lawyer disciplinary system with presumably 
similar consequences for violating professional norms.141  LLLTs are 
already subject to Washington’s attorney-client evidentiary privilege and its 
lawyer fiduciary obligations.142 
 
in Washington, 14 Other States; Recession Blamed, SEATTLE TIMES (July 12, 2012, 9:30 
PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/education/2018675041_collegedegrees13.html (reporting 
that the recession and state cuts in higher education dollars were partly to blame for the drop 
in the number of college degrees held by twenty-five- to thirty-five-year-olds but that 
Washington still ranked fifteenth in the nation for college attainment). 
 138. See generally Rachel Zahorsky & William D. Henderson, Who’s Eating Law Firm’s 
Lunch?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2013, at 33, 33 (highlighting the need to deliver legal services in an 
efficient manner and discussing how legal services companies are more efficiently 
performing some legal services by, for example, “review[ing], manag[ing,] and analyz[ing] 
documents for large-scale litigation” than law firms). 
 139. See E-mail from Thea Jennings, Ltd. License Legal Technician Program Lead, 
Regulatory Servs. Dep’t, Wash. State Bar Ass’n, to author (Dec. 10, 2013, 15:38 EST) (on 
file with author).  The LLLT board recently considered possible business relationships for 
LLLTs while drafting LLLT Rules of Professional Conduct.  The LLLT board concluded 
that LLLTs may not form business relationships with nonlawyers.  For example, companies 
like Wal-Mart could not own and operate a chain of LLLTs. See id.  However, at its 
November 2013 LLLT board meeting, the board approved joint ownership of firms with 
lawyers, provided that LLLTs (i) may not direct a lawyer’s professional judgment, (ii) have 
direct supervisory authority over a lawyer, or (iii) possess a majority interest or exercise 
controlling managerial authority in a firm. Id.  It is important to note that such an LLLT 
provision is subject to further review by the LLLT board or state bar association and would 
only become effective upon additional review and approval by the Washington Supreme 
Court. Id. 
 140. See Yarbrough, supra note 108. 
 141. See Interview with Steve Crossland, supra note 112 (stating that an LLLT board 
committee is working on an ethics code and determining which lawyer ethics rules are 
transferable to LLLTs). 
 142. See WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(K)(3); Holland, supra note 74, at 112. 
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Another concern regarding LLLTs involves their ability to earn sufficient 
income from their limited type of law practice.  The fear expressed by some 
is that LLLTs may “not find the practice lucrative and that the cost of 
establishing and maintaining [an LLLT] practice . . . will require them to 
charge rates close to attorneys”—which ultimately would not increase 
access to justice.143 
The legal services market should deter LLLTs from charging rates near 
or at the same amount as lawyers.  When the rates become similar, 
consumers will presumably hire lawyers given their ability to provide a 
fuller range of legal services—for example, appearing before tribunals.  The 
ability of lawyers to offer a wider array of legal services should keep LLLT 
fees significantly below lawyer rates. 
Whether LLLTs can find the legal services market sufficiently lucrative 
to sustain their practice is an important and open question.  There are 
reasons to believe that LLLTs can survive economically and still offer 
affordable legal services. 
First, LLLT’s may serve a broader population than just low- to middle-
income persons.  Even if that is not the case, the unmet need or potential 
demand for LLLT services is high.  Washington State Bar Executive 
Director Littlewood cited “figures indicating that 85 percent of indigent . . . 
families . . . are not being served” and asserted that “‘[t]he needs of the 
consuming public have never been ‘one size fits all’ . . . .  There is so much 
work to go around.  How can you take it away from people?’”144 
Second, LLLTs probably will not have the high debt burden that afflicts 
many law graduates.  An LLLT graduate at a minimum will have to fund 
forty-five core credits and another fifteen credits in a practice area 
curriculum specialty.  All or some of these credits can be applied to the 
LLLT applicant’s completion of the required two-year AA degree.145 
In contrast, a law graduate will have at least invested approximately 
twice as much—and probably much more—time and money as an LLLT, 
attending both a four-year baccalaureate program and then three years of 
law school.  The average law student today graduates with a $77,728 debt 
burden.146  The prospect of LLLTs earning sufficient money in their 
practice is enhanced by virtue of not having to pay down a high education 
debt like many law graduates and other professionals. 
Third, there is an important lesson to be learned from the growing 
number of legal vendors or services companies assisting large corporate 
clients or law firms, for example, in managing and reviewing their 
documents.  “[T]echnology and law are the wave of the future.”147  The 
 
 143. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005, slip op. at 8 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf. 
 144. See Yarbrough, supra note 108. 
 145. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3333-1-04 (2010). 
 146. Statistics, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
statistics.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 147. Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 138, at 35. 
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market is “developing even more concentrated engines of efficiency and 
scale.”148  Technology may provide—if it has not already—the means for 
LLLTs to realize economic success.149 
There is another related issue about the economics of LLLT practice that 
concerns equal justice.  Some observers fear that the creation of LLLTs 
creates a two-tier justice system.  One tier would be for the poor who rely 
on the more affordable and limited services of LLLTs, which might be, or 
at least is perceived as, inferior.  A second tier would be for more affluent 
persons who would rely on lawyers, a more educated and versatile group of 
legal services providers.  Unlike LLLTs, lawyers can engage in direct 
negotiations with opposing parties and appear before adjudicatory bodies. 
Professor Brooks Holland provides an excellent discussion of the equal 
justice concern.150  He notes that the LLLT service is not inequitable simply 
because it offers a service at a better price.151  He cites the medical 
profession and nurse practitioners as a poignant example of less costly 
service providers who have become a “more widely used, professionalized, 
and respected component of the health care market.”152  Holland ultimately 
concludes that even if the “competitive market vision” for LLLTs does 
materialize as its proponents hope, then a more pragmatic approach should 
govern the debate about “equal-justice concerns.”  “[M]ore exceeds less in 
the real world,”153 and if the LLLT program results in something less than 
equal justice but instead “‘adequate access to justice,” then that is positive 
achievement.154 
CONCLUSION 
The assault continues on the profession’s monopoly of the legal services 
market.  Various market forces, including advances in technology making 
access to legal services more readily available to the public; pressure from 
corporate and other clients to lower the cost of legal services, cutting into 
lawyers’ profit margins; global competition from lawyers and nonlawyers 
to provide legal assistance; and an oversupply of lawyers have compelled 
the profession to change its mode of doing business.  As a result, the 
profession has already discarded, voluntarily or involuntarily, some of its 
 
 148. Id. (quoting Professor Oliver Goodenough of Vermont Law School).  Goodenough 
further notes “that the traditional law firm ‘is no longer the best game in town for delivering 
high-quality legal service through scaling and flexibility.  Rather . . . new [technology] 
service companies’” provide this kind of service. Id. 
 149. Id. at 38 (“[A] technology-driven revolution is overturning how America practices 
law, runs its government and dispenses justice.” (quoting Professor Goodenough)). 
 150. See Holland, supra note 74, at 118–27. 
 151. Id. at 124. 
 152. Id. at 125 (citing Jay S. Markowitz, Letter to the Editor, I Am Your Nurse.  Please 
Call Me ‘Doctor,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at A26). 
 153. Id. at 128. 
 154. Id. (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law:  Connecting Principle to 
Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 61 (2003)). 
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Byzantine rules of self-regulation crafted under the banner of protecting the 
public but more often serving the profession’s self-interests.155 
Resolution 15 and Washington’s LLLT rule also represent significant 
changes for the profession in the delivery of legal services.  They both 
enhance competition, but they will do so in different ways. 
Resolution 15 promotes competition from within the bar by facilitating 
movement of lawyers from one territorial market to another.  For now, such 
movement is limited to the dependents of service members, a relatively 
small percentage of the bar.  This small number should nevertheless not 
overshadow the significance of their being free from geographical restraints 
to earn a livelihood and offer the public additional service providers.  More 
important, the CCJ has officially recognized that it is still possible to protect 
the public and simultaneously strike down these barriers by requiring 
moving lawyers to acquire knowledge of local law through mandatory 
education programs.156 
There is no reason why the same safeguard cannot work for other 
lawyers.  Resolution 15’s mandate to further lawyer mobility for military 
spouse lawyers should be extended to the entire bar, given the potential 
economic and other benefits to lawyers, their families, and the public. 
Washington’s LLLT rule promotes competition from professionals—
nonlawyer technicians—who are outside the bar.  For the first time, 
consumers have the opportunity to obtain legal assistance from nonlawyers 
free from lawyer supervision and related surcharges for such oversight.  The 
nonlawyer service should cost less than retaining a lawyer for the same 
service.  More important, it should open access to justice for many 
Americans. 
Also, LLLTs may offer another benefit.  Like Jeffersonian notions of 
democracy, having more persons participate in the economy and the legal 
system—in this case, LLLTs and hopefully some of those who previously 
have not accessed the justice system—is a good thing for the profession and 
society.157 
 
 155. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 776 (noting that the desire of some in the bar to 
control competition played a role in the profession’s resistance to advertising). 
 156. Another important safeguard not expressly stated in Resolution 15 is to make certain 
that the moving lawyers are in good standing in the profession; for example, there are no 
pending disciplinary investigations.  This important qualification may be subsumed in 
another provision of Resolution 15.  It recognizes that “state bar admission authorities and 
state supreme courts remain responsible for making admission decisions and enforcing their 
own rules for admission . . . .” Resolution 15, supra note 14; see also Akron LawIT, Miller 
Becker:  Navigating the Practice of Law in the Wake of Ethics 20/20 2013, YOUTUBE (Apr. 
5, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pf_MxxQdCM (predicting a regulatory system 
in the next fifty years that permits lawyers who are admitted in one state to practice in other 
states after notifying them and taking a preparatory course on local law). 
 157. LUBAN, supra note 121, at 251 (“[T]o deny someone [access and] equality before the 
law delegitimizes our form of government.”); see Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the 
Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3–10 (2012) (reporting that some experts 
argue that corporate ownership of law firms, such as ownership by Wal-Mart, may result in a 
more efficient and affordable delivery of legal services, increasing access to legal 
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Both Resolution 15 and the LLLT rule are designed to promote consumer 
welfare by enhancing competition for and access to the delivery of legal 
services.  Whether one or both will produce a net increase in consumer 
welfare remains an open question.  As the Washington Supreme Court said, 
it has “[n]o . . . crystal ball” to predict the impact of APR 28.158  The same 
might be said of Resolution 15.  At the very least, however, both 
developments loosen the profession’s monopolistic grip on the legal 
services market.  They also both offer significant promise of enhancing 
competition in the delivery of legal services and overall consumer welfare. 
 
representation, and identifying a First Amendment basis for corporations delivering legal 
services through ownership of law firms). 
 158. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal 
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005, slip op. at 8 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf. 
